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Once we have surrendered our senses 
and nervous systems to the private 
manipulation of those who would try 
to benefit from taking a lease on our 
eyes and ears and nerves, we don't 
really have any rights left. Leasing 
our eyes and ears and nerves to 
commercial interests is like handing 
over the common speech to a private 
corporation, or like giving the earth's 
atmosphere to a company as a 
monopoly.  
 
Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media 
(1964) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The quantity of information available on the Internet is beyond imagination and 
the amount of data that is added every day to the already existing “digital deluge” is 
enormous.1 The overload of information is becoming a major problem for more and 
more people. 2  Under these circumstances, it does not come as a surprise that 
personalisation technologies are rapidly becoming a key tool in the administration of 
communication flows on the Internet. Online content personalisation technologies 
offer possibilities to customise news feeds to an individual’s wishes. They are thus a 
welcome method for tailoring information to the user and helping them him to 
organise the processing of information.  
Bill Gates commended the advantages of customised information as early as 1995. 
Four years later, he said, “you’ll be able to just say what you are interested in, and 
have the screen help you pick out a video that you care about”.3 While the Internet 
has allowed targeting and customising for the shopping of books, music, movies, 
games etc. for quite some time, the personalisation of news is a more recent 
phenomenon.4 In 1995, the Internet pioneer Nicholas Negroponte envisioned the 
“Daily Me” as the future newspaper.5 His vision was that every person would be 
                                                        
1  According to Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform 
How We Live, Work and Think, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013 “in 2013 the amount of stored 
information in the world is estimated to be around 1,200 exabytes, of which less than two percent is non-
digital”. One exabyte is a billion gigabytes. It would only take a little more than two years for this mass of 
digital data to double. 
2  See Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, at p. 51. 
3  Ibid., at p. 39. 
4  Joseph Turow, The Daily You: How the New Advertising Industry is Defining Your Identity and Your World, 
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2011, at pp. 120-37. 
5  Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital, 4th edn, New York: Vintage Books, 1995, at p. 153. 
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able to use technology to create a package of information customised to their 
personal interests.6 What Negroponte did not predict is that today you do not need 
to create the “Daily Me” yourself.7 Algorithms processing enormous quantities of 
data guess what a person wants to read and provide them with a personalised 
selection of news feeds. As Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier write, 
“because of the data’s vast size, decisions may often be made not by humans but by 
machines”.8 If computers rather than human beings are deciding on the news feeds 
that people are going to see on the Internet, this may create social costs. Cass 
Sunstein was the first to forcefully point out the impact of news customisation and 
targeting on deliberative democracy. 9  He warned that these technologies create 
“echo chambers” and a risk of fragmentation. 10 By selecting news that confirms 
already existing views and limiting the opportunities to encounter and relate to the 
views of others, content personalisation may endanger deliberative processes in 
democratic societies. Reactions to Sunstein, claiming that his view was too 
pessimistic, were not long in coming. Hosanagar et al. in 201211 and Benkler et al. in 
201312 both refer to recent quantitative studies which, arguably, contradict Sunstein’s 
evaluation of the societal impact of online content personalisation technologies.  
The discussion launched by Sunstein focused on the impact of online content 
personalisation on deliberative democracy.13 The more radical question, however, as 
to whether computers have replaced humans in deciding what is relevant political 
information, has not been addressed. It is the purpose of this paper to study whether 
technologies can actually regulate human behaviour, while reflecting on the concept 
of regulation in the digital environment and the differences between regulation by 
code and regulation by law. The paper will then explore how code affects individual 
and social autonomies and, finally, will consider whether meta-rules regulating code 
are appropriate. Overall, the aim of the paper is to detail the constitutive features of 
the digital world and elucidate how these create norms that regulate the Internet.  
Before entering the theoretical discussion, the next section will provide some 
factual information on the functioning of the technology and assess some of the 
criticism that has been raised against online content personalisation.  
                                                        
6  Kartik Hosanagar et al., ‘Will the Global Village Fracture into Tribes: Recommender Systems and their 
Effects on Consumers’, University of Pennsylvania, NET Institute Working Papers, Working Paper No. 08-44 
(2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1321962, at p. 6. 
7  See Turow, supra note 4, at p. 9. 
8  See Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, supra note 1, at p. 16. 
9  See Sunstein, supra note 2, at pp. 43-45, 207. 
10  Ibid., at p. 6. 
11  See Hosanagar et al., supra note 6. 
12  Yochai Benkler et al., ‘Social Mobilization and the Networked Public Sphere: Mapping the SOPA-PIPA 
Debate’, Harvard University, Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Berkman Center Research Publication 
No. 2013-16 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2295953.  
13  Sunstein did not address the problem of online content personalisation from a privacy perspective. For an 
account of the privacy issues raised by the wholesale collection and use of behavioural user data online see 
Chris Hoofnagle et al., ‘Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse’ (2012) Harvard Law & Policy 
Review, 6, pp. 273-96. 
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2. HOW CONTENT PERSONALISATION WORKS AND WHY IT IS 
CRITICISED 
2.1 HOW IT WORKS 
Personalisation technologies essentially work as recommenders. They provide 
recommendations that are tailored to the user. In the literature, content-based 
recommenders are distinguished from recommenders based on collaborative 
filtering. 14  Content-based recommenders select information on the basis of some 
property of the content, including music styles or genres of books, films and games. 
Amazon, Netflix15 and Apple’s iTunes Store16 are based on collaborative filtering. 
They provide recommendations “based on what other people like you liked”,17 as 
exemplified by Amazon’s slogan “customers who bought this, also bought...”. Still 
more sophisticated personalisation technologies are used by Google and Facebook. 
In his book “The Filter Bubble”, Eli Pariser explains that since 2009 the Google search 
enginehas been combining the PageRank algorithm with a system of personalisation 
that is able to make guesses about who you are and which sites you may want to 
see.18 For this, Google uses 57 “signals” identifying where you log in, what browser 
you are using, your previous searches etc. This information, combined with the 
mining of data that stem from other sources,19 allows the algorithm to create a profile 
of you.20 Facebook uses the EdgeRank algorithm to select which postings of a user’s 
friends will appear in their news feed. EdgeRank determines the projected relevance 
of the posted content according to criteria such as affinity (amount of time that a user 
spends interacting with this friend), the relative weight of the type of posted content 
(updates on the relationship, for instance, are given high weighting) and time (more 
recent posts are considered to be more relevant than older ones).21 Has the computer 
become an actor in the process of online information selection? 
Pariser caricatured the custom-tailored world that the computer is building for us 
as “a cozy place, populated by our favourite people and things and ideas. (…) We’re 
never bored. We’re never annoyed. Our media is a perfect reflection of our interests 
and desires.” 22  Greg Linden, one of the developers of Amazon’s recommender 
                                                        
14  See Hosanagar et al., supra note 6, at p. 6; Sunstein, supra note 2, at pp. 20-21. 
15  Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You, New York: Penguin Press, 2011, at pp. 129-
31. 
16  See Hosanagar et al., supra note 6, at p. 4. 
17  See Sunstein, supra note 2, at p. 20. 
18  See Pariser, supra note 15, at pp. 3, 177. 
19  On data mining, see Ira Rubinstein et al., ‘Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and 
Technological Approaches’ (2008) University of Chicago Law Review, 75, pp. 261-85; Pariser, supra note 15, at 
pp. 42-46; Turow, supra note 4, at pp. 136, 151, 181. On the way that Gmail, Google’s e-mail service, mines 
user data and the content of messages to sell ads that are related to certain keywords found therein, see 
Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice, New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 2012, at p. 197. 
20  On profiling, see Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, supra note 1, at pp. 160-61; Mireille Hildebrandt and 
Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘The Challenges of Ambient Law and Legal Protection in the Profiling Era’ (2010) The 
Modern Law Review, 73 (3), pp. 428-60, at pp. 431-33; Frederick F. Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and 
Stereotypes, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003. 
21  See Pariser, supra note 15, at p. 38. 
22  Ibid., at p. 12. 
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technology, dismissed Pariser’s sarcastic critique, arguing that personalisation 
technology is something that “seeks to enhance discovery, to help you find novel and 
interesting things”. 23  Pariser explains what worries him about personalisation 
technologies, with an experiment: Arguably, when you Google something at the 
same time as one of your friends in another city, the search results that you and your 
friend get will be quite different.24 In class, two of my international students verified 
Pariser’s findings. Both students, one female from Denmark and one male from 
Canada, simultaneously searched for “dolphin”. Whereas the Danish student’s 
screenshot showed numerous links about dolphins as animals, the Canadian student, 
who is a great football fan, got search results that exclusively related to the Miami 
Dolphins, a US football team.  
2.2 WHAT IT IS USED FOR 
In “Republic.com 2.0” Sunstein emphasised the negative effects of online content 
personalisation on deliberative democracy. He identified three main difficulties: 
1) Fragmentation: Online personalisation technologies arguably facilitate the 
creation of “enclaves of like-minded” people on the Internet.25 If technologies make it 
easy for people to wall off dissenting views, then extremism and group polarisation 
thrive. 26  Cascade or snowball effects are facilitated by the technologies of the 
Internet.27 The spread of hate speech and terrorism may become a danger “through 
the mechanisms of persuasive arguments, social comparisons, and corroboration”, 
particularly in groups that require a high degree of group solidarity.28 
2) Absence of the solidarity effects of general-interest intermediaries: While mass-
media offer shared experiences and create social glue, this is not the case for 
personalised news feeds.29 
3) Commercialisation of freedom: Personalisation blurs the distinction between 
citizens and consumers and swaps free opinion formation for free choice of 
commodities. For Sunstein, freedom in a democratic society presupposes the “ability 
to have preferences formed after exposure to a sufficient amount of information”.30 
Sunstein is concerned that personalisation reduces freedom to the satisfaction of 
private preferences at the expense of common welfare.31 With respect to ordinary 
consumer products, he concedes that the possibility for people to “individuate their 
preferred products” may be advantageous. 32  However, for a system of free 
expression to function properly, diversity in the offer of information and the 
availability of high quality information is preferable. For Sunstein, a well-functioning 
                                                        
23  Greg Linden, ‘Eli Pariser is Wrong’ (2011), available at http://glinden.blogspot.com/2011/05/eli-pariser-is-
wrong.html (all online sources were accessed 27 October 2015). 
24  See Pariser, supra note 15, at pp. 2-3. 
25  See Sunstein, supra note 2, at p. 74. 
26  Ibid., at p. 69. 
27  Ibid., at p. 90. 
28  Ibid., at p. 78. 
29  Ibid., at pp. 103-04. 
30  Ibid., at p. 45. 
31  See Sunstein, supra note 2, at pp. 43-45. 
32  Ibid., at p. 216. 
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system of free expression “might well be compromised when individuals personalise 
their own communications packages”.33 What is at stake is information diversity and 
democratic deliberation.34 
Sunstein’s thesis, that there is not much deliberation beyond “echo chambers” or 
other forms of self-insulation of the “Daily Me” or polarised groups, has been 
challenged by recent empirical studies. In the first data-driven research on 
recommender systems, Hosanagar et al. argue that “the antecedent, that 
recommenders create fragmentation, is ultimately an assumption”.35 More recently 
Yochai Benkler and his colleagues at the Harvard Berkman Klein Center authored an 
empirical analysis of the SOPA-PIPA debate36 that would also seem to contradict 
Sunstein’s thesis.37 These authors argue that their study provides a perspective “on 
the dynamics of the networked public sphere that tends to support the more 
optimistic view of the potential of networked democratic participation”.38 In defence 
of Sunstein, one might argue that the SOPA-PIPA debate was very technology-
centred and thus particularly capable of mobilising masses of tech-interested people 
in the US. Therefore, it may not be representative. Indeed, a new book by Ethan 
Zuckerman seems to confirm Sunstein’s thesis.39 
At the time Sunstein published his book, he identified Internet dynamics such as 
groupism40 or group polarisation41 as primary dangers (for deliberate democracy). 
Since then technological development has made important progress. Today, 
algorithms such as those used by Google and Facebook make assumptions on what 
you like and what you would choose. Users are not in a position to relate to those 
machines’ “computational bias”. If the latest wave of technological development in 
online content personalisation has indeed shifted the power of making decisions 
from humans to computers, as Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier argue,42 the problem 
appears in a new light. Such a scenario implies an agency of computers as artefacts 
and must be quite unsettling for any theoretical thinking that builds on the premise 
that only humans can be legal or political actors. 
While Sunstein’s critique of content personalisation’s effects on deliberative 
democracy has been debated in the academic literature (although with ambiguous 
results), the more radical thesis of the shift of decision-making power from humans 
to computers has not been addressed. If it were true that technology is regulating the 
                                                        
33  Ibid., at p. 218. 
34  On Benkler’s theory on the blogosphere and the networked public sphere see Sunstein, supra note 2, at pp. 
114-17. 
35  Hosanagar et al., supra note 6, at p. 6. This study had a very limited scope and did not extend to the effects 
of personalisation on news programming. 
36  SOPA (Stop Online Piracy Act) and PIPA (Protect IP Act) were proposed by US Congress as new IP 
enforcement bills in 2011. They were stalled as a consequence of massive Internet protests including a 24-
hour Wikipedia blackout on 18/19 January 2012, millions of e-mails and thousands of phone calls 
addressed to members of US Congress to raise awareness of the harm that the planned laws would mean 
for Internet freedom. 
37  Benkler et al., supra note 12. 
38  Ibid., at pp. 9-10. 
39  Ethan Zuckerman, Rewire: Digital Cosmopolitans in the Age of Connection, New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2013.  
40  See Sunstein, supra note 2, at p. 52. 
41  Ibid., at p. 55. 
42  See also Hildebrandt and Koops, supra note 20, at pp. 431-35.  
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behaviour of human beings then this would require important adaptations within 
the legal system. However, the validity of this point cannot be discussed without a 
prior analysis of the regulatory effects of digital technology and the impact they may 
have on individual and social autonomies. 
3. DO PERSONALISATION TECHNOLOGIES REGULATE HUMAN 
BEHAVIOUR?  
In 1980, Langdon Winner famously wrote that “technological innovations are 
similar to legislative acts or political foundings that establish a framework for public 
order that will endure over many generations.” From this Winner concluded that 
“the same careful attention one would give to the rules, roles, and relationships of 
politics must also be given to such things as the building of highways, the creation of 
television networks, and the tailoring of seemingly insignificant features on new 
machines.” 43  As the tailoring and personalisation of content online depends on 
technologies, the question is whether these technologies regulate human behaviour. 
Is “code” a regulator? 
 
3.1 OVERCOMING A STATE-CENTRED CONCEPT OF REGULATION 
The question of whether technology and, more specifically, “code”, should be 
viewed as a regulator would certainly be answered in the negative by any theory 
understanding “regulation” as some form of state intervention that is backed by 
(penal) sanctions. According to Julia Black, such a “command and control” based 
concept of regulation is state-centred, since it “posits a particular role for the state”.44 
State-centred concepts dominate the definitions of regulation proposed by leading 
textbooks as well as those used in government publications.45 In her research, Black 
has provided a detailed critique of a state-centred understanding of regulation, 
arguing that a number of notions call for decentring the concept of regulation, 
including complexity (both causal and with interactions between actors in society), 
fragmentation of knowledge and power, autonomy and ungovernability of actors or 
systems, interactions and interdependencies between social actors and the collapse of 
the public/private distinction.46 Black convincingly shows that decentred concepts of 
regulation have similarities with pluralistic concepts of law. 47 Legal pluralism is 
indeed similar to a decentred concept of regulation insofar as it rejects state-centred 
concepts of the law. Legal pluralists such as Eugen Ehrlich, Niklas Luhmann and 
Gunther Teubner argue that “living law” and other private forms of social ordering 
                                                        
43  Langdon Winner, ‘Do Artifacts Have Politics?’ (1980) Daedalus, 109 (1), pp. 121-36, at pp. 121, 128. 
44  Julia Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (2002) Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 27 (1), pp. 1-35, 
at p. 3. 
45  Ibid., at p. 11. 
46  Ibid., at pp. 4-8. 
47  Ibid., at p. 29. 
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should not be excluded a priori from a definition of law. 48  Similarly, as legal 
pluralism views law as being more encompassing than state law, a decentred concept 
of regulation is not limited to state intervention backed by sanctions. 
3.2 DISTINGUISHING LAW AND REGULATION 
The question, however, is how law and regulation differ in a non-state-centred 
paradigm. Arguments that regulation would be “less than law” (i.e. that the species 
“regulation” is a component of the genus “law”) are rightly rejected by Black.49 
Although Black is rather irresolute with regard to fully embracing the alternative that 
“regulation is more than law”, she seems to conceptualise the law as a technique or 
an instrument employed by regulation.50 In my view, Black’s terminology “more 
than law/less than law” is not really helpful; while regulation is generally the broader 
term (and law the narrower) overlaps are possible in the case of legal rules which do 
not regulate (dispute settlement, enabling clauses, programmatic provisions etc.). 
Consequently, I suggest conceiving law as a modality of regulation. 
Black develops a definition of regulation that, while being decentred, retains an 
element of intentionality and thus explicitly excludes technology, market forces or 
social norms from the definition.51 In my view, the clear-cut exclusion of technology 
from her concept of regulation needs to be questioned. 52  I agree with her that 
technology is not a regulator. It is neutral and can be used for a number of 
purposes.53 Within the setting of her analysis, it is thus only consequent to conclude 
that technology is not a regulator. However, this setting appears to be too narrow for 
the needs of the digital environment. Although technology has no intentions and is 
thus itself not a regulator, it can be used as a tool to execute somebody else’s 
intentions. Often, these are intentions to regulate, that is, in the definition of Philip 
Selznick, to exercise “sustained and focused control” of others’ behaviour. 54 
Technology is indeed a very important means of regulation, as I would like to argue 
in the following.  
 
 
                                                        
48  Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, translation by Walter L. Moll, New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002 (first published 1913 in German, 1936 in English), at pp. 486-98. 
49  See Black, supra note 44, at pp. 31-33. 
50  Ibid., at p. 33. 
51  Ibid., at p. 26, defines regulation as “the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others 
according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome 
or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-
modification.” 
52  Economic theory approaches to regulation generally presuppose that there is a choice. For a discussion of 
the problems that such approaches pose in the realm of digital technology, see Niva Elkin-Koren and Eli M. 
Salzberger, Law, Economics and Cyberspace: The Effects of Cyberspace on the Economic Analysis of Law, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004, at pp. 127-28. 
53  Alain Pottage, ‘Biotechnology as Environmental Regulation’, in Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 
(ed.), Law and Ecology: New Environmental Foundations, New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 106-08, at p. 105. 
54  Philip Selznick, ‘Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation’, in Roger G. Noll (ed.), Regulatory Policy 
and the Social Sciences, New York: Routledge, 1985, pp. 363-64, at p. 363. 
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3.3 TECHNOLOGY AS A MODALITY OF REGULATION 
The first element of my chain of argument is Lawrence Lessig’s distinction of 
four modalities of regulation, including law, social norms, markets and physical 
architectures.55 Langdon Winner claimed that there was a regulatory role of physical 
architecture back in 1980. In “Do artifacts have politics?” he explained his thesis with 
the story of Robert Moses’ architectural politics. Moses, the master builder of many 
public works during the first half of the 20th century in New York, designed 
overpasses on the roads to Long Island to be extremely low-hanging in order to 
prevent poor and black people travelling in tall buses from accessing the beautiful 
public parks on Long Island.56 Lessig uses the architecture metaphor more broadly to 
include “the architecture of the Net – or its ‘code’”.57  
I would agree with Lessig that understanding law as a modality of regulation 
grasps the relationship between the two concepts well. In light of the above 
discussion, I would however disagree with Lessig insofar as his concept of law is 
obviously state-centred. This is (indirectly) revealed by the fact that he distinguishes 
law from markets. Above, I have emphasised the similarities between a decentred 
concept of regulation and a pluralist concept of law. Legal pluralism claims that law 
is not limited to state law but also encompasses forms of law that emanate from 
private actors. Ehrlich argues that “living law” is more important than state law or 
judge-made law since the main source of law has always been and still is society.58 
For Luhmann and Teubner market-specific interpretations of general regulations or 
“lex mercatoria” are prime examples demonstrating the proliferation of privately 
produced law.59 Consequently, under a pluralist concept of law, private processes of 
norm-generation in markets would be considered as “law” and thus become obsolete 
as a distinct modality of regulation. 
Admittedly, in the context of this paper, the conceptualisation of markets within 
regulatory theory is less important than the question of whether physical 
architectures, Lessig’s fourth category, should be conceived as a modality of 
regulation. Lessig defines code as a form of co-action between software and 
hardware on the Internet. 60  He analogises code with architecture because, like 
physical architecture in the real world,61 code delimits where one can go and what 
one can do in the virtual world. James Grimmelmann criticises the spatial analogy 
                                                        
55  Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, New York: Basic Books, 1999, at p. 235. 
56  See Winner, supra note 43, at pp. 123-24. 
57  Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0, 2nd edn, New York: Basic Books, 2006, at p. 81. 
58  See Ehrlich, supra note 48, at pp. 159-64. For Ehrlich, the psychological reaction to the breach of a norm 
would decide whether one was concerned with law or a social norm. Ibid., at pp. 164-65. 
59  Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, translation by Klaus A. Ziegert, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004 (first published 1993 in German, 2004 in English), at p. 293; Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina: 
Legal Pluralism in the World Society’, in Gunther Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a State, Aldershot, 
Brookfield, USA: Dartmouth, 1997, pp. 3-28, at pp. 6-7; see also Gunther Teubner, ‘Autopoiesis and 
Steering: How Politics Profits from the Normative Surplus of Capital’, in Roeland In't Veld et al. (eds), 
Autopoiesis and Configuration Theory: New Approaches to Societal Steering, Dordrecht, Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1991, pp. 127-41, at p. 127. 
60  See Lessig, supra note 55, at p. 121. 
61  Karen Yeung, ‘Towards an Understanding of Regulation by Design’, in Roger Brownsword and Karen 
Yeung (eds), Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes, Oxford: Hart, 
2008, pp. 79-107, at pp. 81-82.  
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evoked by the architecture metaphor as misleading.62 Without discussing Lessig’s 
first three modalities in detail, Grimmelmann argues that software, rather than 
physical architecture, should be considered as the fourth modality of regulation. He 
finds software more persuasive than physical architecture because of programmers’ 
ability to articulate in detail comprehensive and complex systems of regulation, 
something that physical architects are not able to do.63 Grimmelmann is right in his 
assertion that a physical architecture suggests rather simple causalities – something 
that does not fit software programmes. Indeed, software is not only automated, 
immediate and “plastic”,64 it is a complex technology that may be programmed with 
a wide range of attributes “to behave”.65  
If we were to follow Grimmelmann’s suggestion66 and swap computer software 
for physical architectures as a distinct modality of regulation, we would face the 
question of why only software and not hardware, as Lessig’s definition of code 
would imply. Indeed, important developments in the digital environment – such as 
trusted computing, digital rights management (DRM) and integrated proprietary 
systems67 – require software and hardware to dovetail and, thus, singling out one at 
the expense of the other is disputable.68 In my view “technology” would be a better 
term to denote what is really at issue while avoiding both the shortcomings of 
Lessig’s spatial imagery and Grimmelmann's exclusiveness.  
Conceptualising technology as a means or mode of regulation does not imply 
that technology operates in total independence from influences of human beings. I 
reject an instrumentalist approach to technology that would presuppose a 
relationship of linear causality between the technology and its regulatory “mission”. 
As a knife may be used for multiple purposes (as a tool to prepare food or as a 
weapon), DRM technologies, for example, do not just serve to enforce copyright. In a 
review of US court cases that have been decided under the anti-circumvention rules 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Dan Burk has forcefully shown 
how the use of DRM technologies shifted their function from enforcing copyright 
protection towards controlling markets through the exclusion of products that do not 
correspond to a certain standard of technical interoperability.69 Such “mission creep” 
has also been observed with regard to the regulatory functions of other technologies, 
                                                        
62  James Grimmelmann, ‘Regulation by Software’ (2005) Yale Law Journal, 114, pp. 1719-58, at pp. 1727-28. 
63  Ibid., at p. 1728. 
64  Ibid., at p. 1723. 
65  Dan L. Burk, ‘Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology’ (2005) Fordham 
Law Review, 74, pp. 537-73, at p. 546, quoting Pamela Samuelson et al., ‘A Manifesto Concerning the Legal 
Protection of Computer Programs’ (1994) Columbia Law Review, 94, pp. 2308-56, at p. 2316. 
66  See Grimmelmann, supra note 62, at p. 1723. 
67  Apple apps, for example, link users to the Internet, provided they are employing both hardware and 
software that is produced or licensed by Apple Inc. Apps are attractive to users as they provide 
applications of software that require just a few finger taps to book a hotel, see the latest weather forecast or 
find the nearest bus stop and so on. However, they have the considerable disadvantage of locking the user 
into an iron cage of a proprietary digital system of integrated software and hardware. 
68  Michael Madison, ‘Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things’ (2005-2006) Case Western Law 
Review, 56 (2), pp. 381-478, at p. 402. 
69  See Burk, supra note 65, at pp. 561-68. 
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including genetic use restriction technologies (GURTs).70 Similarly, the function of 
the technology employed for online personalisation depends on how it is interpreted 
by an observer. Whereas users of the Google search engine may interpret the 
function of the PageRank algorithm as a means for tackling information overload, the 
possibility to target consumers for advertising purposes is more important for 
Google. The technology itself is neutral but it can be employed for a number of 
purposes. The function that a technology fulfils is always a social construct and 
depends on interpretation.71 It is the observer of the technology (a corporate actor, a 
user, a defender of deliberative democracy etc.) who sees those features of the 
technology that are obvious to them, and the regulator (a government, a corporation) 
employs those functions of the technology that best serve its interests. 
Consequently, I favour a broad concept of regulation that allows the 
conceptualisation of both law (in a pluralist sense, as set out above) and technology 
as distinct modalities of regulation. 
4. REGULATION BY “CODE” V. REGULATION BY LAW 
So far, I have found that technology, including personalisation technology, is a 
mode of regulation. An instrumentalist view of code was rejected with the argument 
that the function a technology fulfils is not a constant but is dependent on 
interpretation, and may vary according to the specific discourse within which it is 
articulated. With regard to both DRM systems and online content personalisation, I 
have shown that the discourse can shift depending on multiple legal, economic, 
political or other influences. In many cases, the primary function of digital 
technologies online is to enforce IP rights or other types of public or private rules. 
Importantly, a rule (e.g. a complex mathematical formula) that is programmed in 
code does not depend on something outside the technological thing for its 
enforcement; it is self-executing. This is different from legal regulation, where 
execution is generally the result of close cooperation between the legal system and 
the political system. According to Luhmann, the legal system is responsible for the 
production of decisions determining the conditions under which physical force can 
be applied (e.g. the force that is applied when a convict is imprisoned).72 Practically, 
these decisions are taken by the courts, a sub-system of the law. The political system 
(the state), in turn, provides the possibilities to actually enforce the legal decisions. 
The potential availability of the means of enforcement is the premise for the law 
being obeyed. With regard to the technologies of the Internet, the potential 
availability of physical force as a means of rule enforcement is of little importance. 
Since digital technology is self-executing, there is no need for the political system to 
                                                        
70  As Alain Pottage has shown, GURTs have changed their mission three times: from protecting IP, to 
becoming a tool for biosafety protection, to becoming an incentive for co-existence policies. See Pottage, 
supra note 53, at pp. 105-25. 
71  “Materiality is sociality” as Bruno Latour would say. See Bruno Latour and Vincent A. Lépinay, L’économie, 
science des intérêts passionnés, Paris: La Découverte, 2008, at p. 107. See also Helen Nissenbaum, ‘From 
Preemption to Circumvention: If Technology Regulates, Why Do We Need Regulation (and Vice Versa)?’ 
(2011) Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 26, pp. 1367–86, at pp. 1376-77, quoting Bryan Pfaffenberger, 
‘Technological Dramas’ (1992) Science, Technology, & Human Values, 17 (3), pp. 282-312, at p. 283. 
72  Niklas Luhmann, Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999, at pp. 163-70. 
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guarantee the enforcement of its underlying rules. How should we conceive this 
peculiar interdependency between the technology and the regulations that it helps to 
implement? 
Code appears to engineer the form that the regulation can take to navigate social 
behaviour in cyberspace. The specificities of the digital environment seemingly affect 
the “competition” between law and technology as modes of regulation and their 
employment by legislators or private actors, respectively. In the case of online 
content personalisation, the question is therefore: how exactly does regulation by 
code relate to regulation by law? Does the former substitute for the latter? If yes, 
would this affect individual and social autonomies? In order to respond to these 
questions we first need to analyse more closely the difficult relationship between the 
social (communicative processes) and the technology, and study how online 
personalisation technologies affect individual and social autonomies, before 
clarifying the concept of law in cyberspace. 
4.1 THE “DISPOSITIVE” OF ONLINE CONTENT PERSONALISATION: 
CONCEPTUALISING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMU-
NICATION AND TECHNOLOGY 
For socio-legal studies the relationship between the social and technology is 
difficult to conceptualise. Niklas Luhmann’s sociological systems theory provides for 
one of the most sophisticated analyses of modern society and its legal system. In the 
Internet context, however, the weakness of Luhmann’s theory is that its radical focus 
on communication implies the marginalisation of technological media. 73  For 
Luhmann, only communications are able to communicate: human beings, brains and 
computers do not communicate. Although he concedes that computers will often 
produce a structural coupling between consciousness and communication, he insists 
that their effect must remain indiscernible for both human consciousness and social 
communication.74 For Luhmann, treating technological media as a mere auxiliary 
means of communication was ultimately a question of theory design that allowed 
him to tackle the enormous complexities arising from his project of a general theory 
of modern society. However, suppressing the important influences that technological 
media have on individual and social autonomies turns out to be a considerable 
drawback for social theorising in the 21st century. 
In order to cope with the enhanced importance of technological media in the 
digital environment, I suggest a refinement of Luhmann’s approach by adding a 
material link to systems theory. As I explain in the following, my ideas are inspired 
by Michel Foucault’s concept of the “dispositive”. Foucault introduced the 
dispositive in the mid-1970s and assigned it a central place in his philosophy, at the 
moment of a methodological transition from “archaeology” to “genealogy”. 75 As 
                                                        
73  For a similar critique see Vagias Karavas, Digitale Grundrechte: Elemente einer Verfassung des 
Informationsflusses, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007, at pp. 146-50. 
74  Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society, vol. I, translated by Rhodes Barret, Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2012, at pp. 65-66. 
75  Jürgen Link, ‘Dispositiv und Interdiskurs. Mit Überlegungen zum "Dreieck" Foucault – Bourdieu – 
Luhmann‘, in Clemens Rammler and Rolf Parr (eds), Foucault in den Kulturwissenschaften: eine 
Bestandesaufnahme, Söchtenau: Synchron, 2007, pp. 219-38, at p. 219. 
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Foucault’s writings are often difficult to decipher, it is not surprising that various 
scholars have interpreted the concept in different ways. The most extensive 
definition of the dispositive that Foucault himself offered can be found in an 
interview that he gave to the psychologist Jacques-Alain Miller and his colleagues 
from the University of Paris VIII in 1977.76 According to Jürgen Link’s analysis of the 
interview, the methodological function of the dispositive for Foucault is to capture a 
complex strategic assemblage including a horizontal and a vertical dimension. 77 
Horizontally, the dispositive consists of discourses and non-discursive elements; 
vertically, elements of power are identified to create hierarchical relationships 
between those who dispose power and the addressees of such disposal. Importantly, 
the dispositive is dynamic in time, and the horizontal and vertical dimensions are 
interwoven.78 
Horizontally, the discursive elements of the dispositive are combined with each 
other (inter-discursive relationship) and with non-discursive, material elements 
(trans-discursive relationship).79 In a Luhmannian reading, one could think of the 
systems of law, politics and economics as examples of the dispositive’s discursive 
elements. Furthermore the discursive elements would combine with non-discursive 
elements, including technology and other material things, to constitute the trans-
discursive relationship. In this way the dispositive establishes the link between the 
social and technology, which was missing in Luhmann.80 The vertical dimension of 
the dispositive reflects an asymmetrical power relationship between hegemony and 
subjection, or between “master and servant”, if expressed in Marxist terms.81 The 
disposability of power establishes the distinction between those who make the 
decisions and the subjects of such decisions. Both dimensions are mutually 
interwoven and affect each other. Together they contribute to the dynamic evolution 
of the dispositive.82 
Although Foucault always refused to think about general categories, this does 
not mean, as Giorgio Agamben emphasises, “that there are no concepts of a general 
character” in his thinking. It is indeed the dispositive, Agamben continues, which 
takes the place, within a Foucauldian strategy, of a “general category … of 
rationality”. 83  Consequently, the dispositive has a potentially broad area of 
application, which goes beyond the specific semantic contexts (such as sexuality, 
madhouse, prison etc.) in which Foucault himself applied the concept. 
Hence, I suggest using the conceptual elements, outlined above, to describe 
online content personalisation as a dispositive. When doing so, in the horizontal 
                                                        
76  Michel Foucault, ‘Le jeu de Michel Foucault’, in Daniel Defert and François Ewald (eds), Michel Foucault. 
Dits et Ecrits, Paris: Gallimard, 1994, at pp. 298-329. 
77  See Link, supra note 75, at pp. 223-25. 
78  For an interpretation of Foucault’s dispositive that does not emphasise the vertical dimension see Alain 
Pottage, ‘The Materiality of What?’ (2012) Journal of Law and Society, 39 (1), pp. 167-83, at p. 182. 
79  See Jürgen Link, ‘Dispositiv’, in Clemens Kammler, et al. (eds), Foucault-Handbuch: Leben - Werk - Wirkung, 
Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2008, pp. 237–242, at p. 239. 
80  In Luhmannian terms this could be conceptualised as a structural coupling between communication and 
consciousness through a technical medium, requiring a further specification of the interplay between 
semantic processes and technical-physical causalities. 
81  See Link, supra note 75, at pp. 220, 227. 
82 See Foucault, supra note 76, at p. 299. See also Link, supra note 75, at pp. 222-23. 
83  Giorgio Agamben, Che cos'è un dispositivo?, Roma: Nottetempo, 2006, at p. 13. 
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dimension of the dispositive the most relevant discursive elements are the economic 
sub-topics of selling big data, targeted advertising or tackling information overload, 
the legal sub-topics of free speech, access rights, consumer and privacy protection, 
and the political sub-topics of information diversity or deliberative democracy etc. 
These discursive elements interrelate with each other in the sphere of communication 
as relationships between the systems of economics, law and politics. At the same 
time they are in a trans-discursive relationship with material elements, including the 
algorithms as well as the mechanisms of data mining as employed by personalisation 
technologies. The horizontal dimension is interwoven with the vertical one where an 
asymmetry of power (and knowledge) exists in the relationship between Internet 
companies (Facebook, Google, Amazon etc.) and consumers/users/citizens. The 
vertical dimension impinges upon the horizontal since the majority of users may not 
be aware that their online behaviour is being tracked by a certain web page.84 Those 
users who know about online content personalisation will rarely be able to 
circumvent the technology. 85  The corporation owning a social network or other 
Internet platform generally enjoys hegemony of power and knowledge whereas the 
user (consumer or citizen) is in a situation of subjection and will often not be aware 
of the rules that are embodied in the technology’s functionality.86 It is the corporation 
(specifically the programmers acting as its extended arm) that knows best how the 
code works and it is the corporation that has the power to change the code. The user 
in general is relatively powerless – his influence ends at the interface level and he has 
no possibility of perceiving let alone influencing the conditions of the computer’s 
operations.87 In all likelihood, there will be some vertical counter-pressure coming 
from hackers and other tech-savvy users who are able to opt out from content 
personalisation or understand its functioning. While they will be able to subvert the 
hegemon’s total control of the code on rare occasions, hackers will seldom (if ever) be 
powerful enough to annihilate the general asymmetry. What is more, the capabilities 
of hackers are not widely distributed in society and even those tech-savvy users who 
manage to circumvent or turn off personalisation will find switching to alternative 
social networking sites difficult because of the technology’s lock-in effects.88 
                                                        
84  Hildebrandt and Koops, supra note 20, at p. 444. Some users may accept an intrusion into their privacy 
sphere in exchange for free applications. See Elkin-Koren and Salzberger, supra note 52, at p. 116. 
85  For an account of the practical difficulties users face when they want to find out about a web page’s 
targeting and tracking activities or if they decide to opt out from online content personalisation, see Turow, 
supra note 4, at pp. 180-82. 
86  Elkin-Koren and Salzberger, supra note 52, at p. 123. 
87  Friedrich A. Kittler, ‘Protected Mode’, in John Johnston (ed.), Literature, Media, Information Systems: Essays, 
Amsterdam: GB Arts International, 1997, pp. 156-68, at p. 158:  “The higher and more effortless the 
programming languages, the more insurmountable the gap between those languages and a hardware that 
still continues to do all of the work. … While on the one hand it remains possible in principle to write user-
software or cryptograms with a knowledge of codes or algorithms, on the other and user-friendly 
concealed hand it is by now impossible to decipher the product specifications of the finished product or 
even to change these specifications.” Quoted in Cornelia Vismann and Markus Krajewski, ‘Computer 
Juridisms’ (2007) Grey Room, 29, pp. 90-109, at p. 96. 
88  Lock-in is the dark side of network effects. “Network effect” is a term used in the economic literature to 
describe the effects that make the value of a network increase to the user as the number of participants of 
the network grows. Prime examples are telephone networks and the Internet. See Michael L. Katz and Carl 
Shapiro, ‘Systems Competition and Network Effects’ (1994) Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8 (2), pp. 93-115. 
As leaving the advantages of the network would create costs, lock-in is the consequence. See Burk, supra 
note 65, at pp. 552-53. 
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4.2 THE PERSONIFICATION OF COMPUTERS 
By drawing our attention to the “materiality” of law the dispositive allows us to 
examine more closely how code impacts the law.89 This brings us back to our initial 
question of whether the latest wave of technological developments in online content 
personalisation have indeed established computers as decision-makers or actors in 
law and politics. Michel Callon, Bruno Latour and John Law have advanced a 
sociology of an actor-network (ANT) that includes both human and non-human 
actors.90 Latour’s ANT has an “old kinship”91 with Foucault’s dispositive since the 
actor-network is dynamic and heterogeneous and its nodes include both material 
and semantic elements.92 In “Politics of Nature” Latour attributes action to new types 
of “actants” that are not human actors.93 Teubner has shown that, in the case of 
electronic contracting, the law already attributes elements of legal personality to non-
humans in certain cases. 94  Arguably, personification of electronic agents has, 
ultimately, turned out to be a successful strategy to cope with the risk of uncertainty 
in electronic contracting. 95  Rather than discussing failures in automated data 
processing in terms of causalities, the law is here considering contracting between 
humans and machines.96 The focus is now on mutual expectations in contractual or 
liability relationships. By treating electronic agents (including computers exhibiting 
artificial intelligence) as actants, the law is socialising materiality. According to 
Teubner, it is not necessary to endow machines with the full status of a legal 
personality – the recognition of a limited capacity to act will be sufficient.97 To this 
end, the law may, for instance, hypothesise a standardised behaviour of computers in 
typical situations and thus stabilise normative expectations. As a consequence, the 
legal personification of computers turns out to be a strategy of society to defend itself 
against the new actants.  
In a second step, Latour introduces “hybrids” as the personification of 
associations between human actors and actants.98 Hybrids are particularly important 
in the Internet environment as the computer and the user interweave into a mutual 
dependency.99 Rather than perceiving the computer merely as a passive tool of the 
                                                        
89  See Pottage, supra note 78, at pp. 168-69. 
90  Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005; Michel Callon, ‘The Sociology of an Actor-Network’, in Michel Callon et al. (eds), Mapping the 
Dynamics of Science and Technology: Sociology of Science in the Real World, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986, pp. 
19-34; John Law, ‘Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of Portuguese Expansion’, in 
Wiebe E. Bijker et al. (eds), The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology 
and History of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987, pp. 111-34, at p. 111. 
91  See Pottage, supra note 78, at p. 180. 
92  See Latour, supra note 90, at pp. 128-29. 
93  Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2004, at pp. 62-70.  
94  Gunther Teubner, ‘Rights of Non-Humans? Electronic Agents and Animals as New Actors in Politics and 
Law’ (2006) Journal of Law and Society, 33 (4), pp. 497-521, at pp. 505-08. 
95  Ibid., at p. 503.  
96  Ibid., at p. 511. 
97  Ibid., at p. 515 
98  See Latour, supra note 93, at pp. 75-82. 
99  Vagias Karavas, ‘Das Computer-Grundrecht: Persönlichkeitsschutz unter informationstechnischen 
Bedingungen’ (2010) WestEnd: Neue Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, 7 (2), pp. 95-108, at p. 99. 
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user, ANT encourages one to understand it as a thing that is able to influence and 
actually transform the communication process. According to Mayer-Schönberger, 
“user-created content, peer-production, blogging, media and knowledge sharing, 
and online social networks … created the language that enabled the podcasting wave, 
much like the actor-network approach would suggest.”100 When the user/computer 
dichotomy is substituted by hybrids, the methodological focus shifts to the quality of 
the relationship between the humans and actants. Teubner has pointed to the 
problems of alienation and reification of social relations that have accompanied the 
proliferation of computer- and Internet-based communication. 101  Alienation was 
palpable in the reactions of large segments of society when the National Security 
Agency’s (NSA) all-embracing Internet surveillance was discovered and Google, 
Facebook, Twitter, Apple, Microsoft and their like were suspected of clandestine 
cooperation.102 Suddenly, millions of Internet users around the globe became aware 
of how vulnerable their association with the computer was. In the lobbying initiative 
with the US Government that the major Internet companies launched as a reaction to 
this, the frequent use of the word “trust” was telling. Microsoft put it in a nutshell: 
“People won’t use technology they don’t trust.”103 Reification may be a problem 
when legal rules are expressed in the medium of code. Indeed, the embedding of 
rules in code rather than text will affect the performance of the rules.104 Classically, 
legal rules are enacted in the form of a statute, or act, and written down in the 
medium of text. Legal texts need to be interpreted in order to unfold the rule’s 
meaning and take effect on third persons. Generally speaking, the interpretation of 
legal rules that are formalised in a printed document is a semantic exercise that 
involves a person inferring a certain claim from a postulated rule and one or several 
claimed addressees of that rule. If there is a dispute on the right interpretation of the 
text and the rule enshrined therein, it is ultimately the task of a judge to make an 
authoritative decision. Conversely, when rules are expressed in the medium of code, 
the scope for interpretation is minimal. Code, as mentioned above, is largely self-
executing. The addressee of code (the user of the Google search engine, for instance) 
will not have the ability to influence the outcome of the interpretation of the rule (the 
                                                        
100  Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, ‘Demystifying Lessig’ (2008) Wisconsin Law Review, 4, pp. 713-46, at p. 745. 
101  See Teubner, supra note 94, at p. 521. 
102  Although Google, Apple, Yahoo, Microsoft, Facebook and AOL have denied having given NSA consumer 
data for surveillance purposes, Rajesh De, the NSA general counsel, testified in a hearing of the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (an independent agency within the US Government) on 19 March 2014 
that “all communications content and associated metadata harvested by the NSA under a 2008 surveillance 
law occurred with the knowledge of the companies – both for the internet collection program known as 
Prism and for the so-called ‘upstream’ collection of communications moving across the internet.” ‘US Tech 
giants knew of NSA data collection, agency’s top lawyer insists’, The Guardian (19 March 2014). 
103  Available at http://reformgovernmentsurveillance.com; the lobbying campaign went online on 10 
December 2013. 
104  John Law and Vicky Singleton, ‘Performing Technology’s Stories: On Social Constructivism, Performance, 
and Performativity’ (2000) Technology and Culture, 41 (4), pp. 765-75, at p. 767; for a philosophical account 
of the performative force of law: Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’ 
(1990) Cardozo Law Review, pp. 919-1045, at pp. 941-73;  Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: 
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, translation by William Rehg, Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1996, for whom the law is a system of knowledge and a system of action at the same time; the 
founding text for the speech act theory is John L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words, 2nd edn, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975. 
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algorithm). She will either have to accept the code’s performance (for instance the 
computations made on the basis of the 57 “signals’” input) and content herself with 
the search results displayed on her computer screen or, alternatively, she will have to 
exit from the service, although this might incur transaction costs. 105  Technology 
enlists users into particular roles and this may mean a curtailing of individual or 
social autonomies. Do we need meta-rules to protect essential freedoms on the 
Internet and to counteract the code’s effects of alienation and reification? 
4.3 THE CONCEPT OF LAW IN CYBERSPACE 
The question about meta-rules for cyberspace requires a deeper reflection on the 
structural relationship between code and law from a normative perspective. Hence, 
we need to elucidate the essential features of the concept of law in the digital 
networked environment. For this, H.L.A. Hart's distinction between primary rules 
and secondary rules is helpful. 
For Hart, primary rules are rules that impose obligations (e.g. obligations not to 
use violence, theft or deception).106 The obligations imposed by primary rules require 
serious social pressure against deviation.107 Secondary rules are rules that determine 
the operation of primary rules (determining which rules are actually primary rules, 
how primary rules are changed and how breaches thereof are adjudicated). 
Secondary rules are rules of validation, they reflect on the validity of primary rules. 
Whereas primary rules are operations of orders, secondary rules are “parasitic” upon 
the first and function as second order observations.108 Rules of the first type “concern 
actions involving physical movement or changes”; secondary rules lead “to the 
creation or variation of duties or obligations”. 109  There is clearly a hierarchical 
relationship between the two types of rules in a similar way to the hierarchy between 
constitutional norms and norms of ordinary law. Constitutional rules are of a higher 
hierarchical order than rules of ordinary law because they determine the conditions 
of the law’s self-production, including the procedures of legitimation that must be 
respected when producing law. 
Could one translate this distinction between primary and secondary rules into 
the digital environment? Seconding Teubner, I would like to argue that this is indeed 
possible. Code has the effect of controlling conduct and is thus analogous to Hart’s 
concept of primary rules.110 The fact that on the Internet the enforcement of primary 
rules is caused by technical constraints rather than social pressure does not make the 
analogy invalid. For Hart, societies with only primary rules of obligation suffer from 
considerable defects, including 1) uncertainty as to what the rules are, 2) the static 
character of the rules and 3) inefficiency (of the diffuse social pressure by which the 
                                                        
105  See Burk, supra note 65, at pp. 552-53. 
106  H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, at p. 89. 
107  Ibid., at p. 84. 
108  Ibid., at p. 79. 
109  Ibid., at p. 79. 
110  Gunther Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory?’, in 
Christian Joerges et al. (eds), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism, Oxford, Portland, Or.: Hart 
Publishing, 2004, pp. 3-28, at p. 23. 
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rules are maintained).111 Similarly, rules embodied in code resemble the static quality 
of primary rules, since for the persons affected it is hard to change them. In the realm 
of personalisation technologies, for instance, users of the Google search engine have 
no possibility of changing the rules underlying the PageRank algorithm.112 Moreover, 
there may often be uncertainty as to the existence of a rule underlying certain 
operations of code or the rule’s scope. 113  This is clearly the case with online 
personalisation, since users are either not aware that the search result they are 
getting is personalised or do not know exactly how the algorithm works.114 Finally, 
rules of code correspond to the inefficiency feature of primary rules since there is 
often no special independent agency ruling on the validity of rules of code, including 
the rules that are embedded in content personalisation algorithms.115  
As mentioned, uncertainty, the static character and the inefficiency of primary 
rules are their main defects. According to Hart, more advanced societies have 
developed secondary rules that provide remedies for these major defects of primary 
rules. In the Internet context, secondary rules would accordingly be rules that 
provide remedies for the defects of rules that are enshrined in the medium of code. 
For Teubner such rules are “constitutional rules”. 
When using the term constitutional rules in the Internet context, Teubner argues 
that the traditional concept of the “constitution” should be used very broadly, to also 
encompass global phenomena beyond the constitution of the nation state.116 While 
arguing that a functional equivalent of the national constitution exists at the global 
level, he cautions that it would be wrong to simply transfer “nation-state 
circumstances to world society”.117 Similarly, one needs to be careful when extending 
constitutional thinking to cyberspace.  
For Teubner, the weak point in Hart’s theory is that the proposed remedies for 
the three deficiencies of primary rules all finally converge in an ultimate rule of 
recognition. This rule of recognition raises the problem of the infinite regress of 
metameta-norms. It is thus not able to overcome the validity paradox of law that is 
self-created. 118  As a solution, Teubner suggests acknowledging the distinction 
between the formal constitutions that exist in most countries in the Western world 
and civil constitutions as products of civil society. He recommends identifying 
secondary rules emerging from civil constitutional frameworks and reformulating 
them within the highly formalised context of the “official” constitution.119 I would 
like to further elaborate on Teubner’s ideas and relate these to online content 
personalisation in the next section. 
                                                        
111  See Hart, supra note 106, at pp. 90-91. 
112  See Pariser, supra note 15, at pp. 30-35. 
113  See Hart, supra note 106, at p. 90. 
114  See Pariser, supra note 15, at p.10, arguing that the “filter bubble is invisible”. 
115  See Hart, supra note 106, at p. 91. 
116  See Teubner, supra note 110, at pp. 20. 
117  Ibid., at p. 5. 
118  Ibid., at p. 23. 
119  Ibid., at p. 24. 
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5. SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND META-RULES FOR 
ONLINE CONTENT PERSONALISATION 
The concept of “civil constitution” or “societal constitution” has played a central 
role in Teubner’s most recent work. Teubner’s use of “constitution” differs 
significantly from the way legal practitioners would define the concept. Rather than 
referring to the formalised text that is known as the constitution of a nation state, he 
understands “constitution” in a very broad sense, amounting to a kind of 
“constitutional pluralism”. As a starting point, Teubner refers to the internal 
differentiation of social systems into an organised-professional sphere and a 
spontaneous sphere. 120  This has similarities with Jürgen Habermas’ distinction 
between the political public sphere, which is organised, and civil society, which is 
spontaneous and chaotic.121 According to Habermas the two concepts “are not mere 
normative postulates but have empirical relevance”.122 While Habermas made this 
observation in the realm of the political system, 123  Teubner stresses that the 
distinction is manifest in all sub-systems of society. It is particularly evident not only 
in the political system but also in the economic system where corporations build the 
organised-professional sphere and consumers populate the spontaneous sphere.124 
The distinction of spontaneous/organised is essential to an understanding of the 
interrelation between formal and civil constitutional arenas. For Teubner, this 
distinction “is the starting point for societal constitutionalism, as reflexive politics is 
realised in different ways in each of the two spheres. The democratic quality of each 
social sector depends on their mutual interplay.”125 The organised sphere does not 
receive direct input from the spontaneous sphere. In the economic system, for 
instance, it is often only after a decision has been taken in the organised sphere of 
corporations that a reaction is triggered in the spontaneous sphere of consumers.  
The main driving force in the spontaneous sphere are NGOs, labour unions, 
consumer organisations, environmentalism, social movements, networks of Internet 
activism and other manifestations of protest. “Bottom-up constitutionalisation” is the 
denomination for liberalising thrusts that emerge from civil society – often in 
transnational contexts – and seek to politicise private consumer preferences as a tool 
to build up pressure against transnational corporations (TNCs). Teubner is optimistic 
that globalisation offers the chance for a better distribution of power in the 
relationship between the spontaneous and organised spheres. A structural challenge 
is posed by the fact that global regimes are detached from the close structural 
coupling between the systems of law and politics that is the typical paradigm of the 
                                                        
120  Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012, at pp. 88-89. 
121  See Habermas, supra note 104, at pp. 373-79. 
122  Ibid., at p. 373. 
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rationalisation in society, “lifeworld” describes a sphere of informal living together that contrasts with the 
reality of systems and leaves room for spontaneity and chaos. See Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of 
Communicative Action. Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, translation by Thomas 
MacCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press, 2007. 
124  See Teubner, supra note 120, at p. 89. 
125  Ibid., at pp. 89-90. 
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nation state. 126  The question is how constitutional guarantees could be legally 
institutionalised in a way that would allow the spontaneous sphere to increasingly 
exert checks on and controls over the organised sphere.127 
The organised-professional sphere of social sub-systems is the second aspect of 
Teubner’s societal constitutionalism. Considering the transnational and global reach 
of most systems, the challenge consists in convincing not only national constitutional 
frameworks but also internal constitutions of formal organisations to respond to 
irritations coming from the spontaneous sector. Concerning the economic system, the 
main problem is what Teubner calls the “motivation-competency dilemma”. 128 
Whereas actors outside the organised sector are usually highly motivated to 
strengthen limitations within the economy, they will often lack the competence to do 
so effectively. Corporations, for their part, would have the competence to implement 
changes but often lack the motivation to do so. Since direct interventions are not 
available in the organised sphere at the transnational and global levels, indirect 
learning pressures are required. Pressure on TNCs to engage in learning to adapt 
would mainly come from “consumers on whose purchasing behaviour the 
corporations depend”.129 
If we relate these thoughts to the dispositive of online content personalisation, we 
have to return to Hart and acknowledge that a communicative process would be 
necessary to reflect on appropriate secondary rules for the Internet environment. 
Such an exercise would need to start in the specific sub-system of society and observe 
the system’s self-foundation and the emergence of normative expectations out of an 
internal reflexive process. In a second step, constitutionalisation would require a 
juridification of the self-founded normative expectations within a legal process that is 
in itself reflexive.130 As a means of constitutionalisation, the two reflexive processes 
serve to externalise the founding paradox of law to different social sub-systems and, 
hence, replace infinite regress, Hart’s method of deparadoxification. In the case of 
online content personalisation, the specific social system would mainly be the 
economy, with the transnational Internet companies in the organised-professional 
sphere and the billions of Internet users in the spontaneous sphere. Considering the 
extreme complexities of Internet technologies and the one-sided distribution of 
power and knowledge between corporations and Internet users, the motivation-
competency dilemma is particularly pronounced. As outlined above, this dispositive 
would call for two types of meta-rules: first, rules that regulate the personification of 
electronic agents and intelligent actants where this is needed to defend individual 
and social autonomies. The focus here should be on stabilising mutual expectations 
in contractual or liability relationships between users and networked computers. 
Second, would be rules that protect the relationship of trust between the user and the 
networked computer. In this regard the famous “Computer-Grundrecht”, the 
constitutional right granting the confidentiality and integrity of information 
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technology (IT) systems comes to mind. This constitutional right, created by the 
German Constitutional Court in a landmark decision of 2008,131 has been interpreted 
as specifically protecting the association between the user and the IT system in 
addition to issues of privacy.132 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The above analysis has shown that personalisation technologies may increase 
users’ capacities to deal with the enormous amount of information that is available 
on the Internet and reduce complexity. 133  However, algorithms and automated 
processes used for the personalisation of information may sometimes affect societal 
values in critical ways. A thorough understanding of the interrelationship between 
technology, regulation and law is necessary to assess how online content 
personalisation affects individual and social autonomies and where meta-rules 
would be required as safeguards. An analysis informed by Luhmann’s sociological 
systems theory needs to be complemented with insights stemming from a free 
interpretation of Foucault’s concept of the dispositive. The Internet is a hybrid 
techno-social network where human intelligence is required to make sure that 
algorithms work for the benefit of humanity and do not interfere with key societal 
values. Finally, Teubner’s theory of civil constitutionalism allowed outlining how the 
law can respond to threats to individual and social autonomies caused by online 
personalisation technologies.  
 
Although the provision of concrete solutions is beyond the scope of this paper, I 
would like to conclude on a more practical note. To effectively protect endangered 
autonomies in a context of personalisation technologies, constitutional rights would 
need to (positively) unfold protection at both an individual level and an institutional 
level.134 Such an understanding of constitutional rights obviously does not limit their 
effects to the relationship individual/state. 
At the individual rights level, the protection of a data subject’s privacy and 
personal data is crucial.135 These rights are preconditions for individual autonomy 
and the formation of the “self”, which is vital for any natural person. Data protection 
is also necessary for individuals’ opinion-building and their ability to express 
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themselves freely.136 It would therefore not be sufficient to interpret privacy and data 
protection as a purely negative right “to be left alone”.137 Rather, some positive action 
involving public and private actors may be required as, for example, the new General 
Data Protection Regulation of the European Union demonstrates.138 The regulation is 
a directly applicable instrument,139 requiring data controllers (public and private) to 
properly protect personal data at the time of their collection and during the whole 
duration of the processing. The regulation is sensitive to tracking and data 
processing techniques, particularly those which consist in profiling a natural person. 
The data subject should be informed of the existence of the profiling, the logic 
involved in such automatic personal data processing and the consequences thereof. 
According to Articles 21 and 22, the data subject shall have the right to object to 
automated data processing and profiling. Finally, data controllers may only use data 
collected for the purposes for which the data subjects have given their consent. 
At the institutional rights level, threats to the autonomy of the political discourse 
are in the foreground. It will be necessary in the future to keep a close eye on 
interactions between automated processes of online content personalisation and 
decision-making in democratic societies. If the predicted development towards echo 
chambers and discourse fragmentation were to be confirmed, remedial measures 
would need to be considered. For the proper functioning of a democratic society, the 
availability of independent, diverse and objective information is key. Although the 
blogosphere is greatly enriching the political discourse, it does not always provide 
reliable information, and bloggers often do not work according to quality standards 
of journalism that are comparable to those of renowned newspapers and public 
service broadcasters. As advertising money is being diverted towards Internet 
platforms, commercial journalism has come under economic pressure. For the sake of 
working democratic order, governments may thus need to think about ways to 
enhance public service journalism on the Internet, without unjustifiably distorting 
competition between subsidised and commercial mass media. 
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